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IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EUGENE A. ANDERSON, 
Pla~ntvff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
KATHLEEN D. ANDERSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case 
No. 9396 
This appeal arises from an order entered by· the 
lower court revising downward certain requirements with 
regard to the payment of child support under an earlier 
divorce decree. Plaintiff was awarded the divorce but 
defendant was awarded the custody of the two minor 
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2 
children, subject to reasonable rights of visitation in 
plaintiff. Plaintiff filed an order to show cause, seeking 
custody, or, in the alternative, reduction in child support 
payments. Custody was denied, but the child support 
payments were reduced. From that reduction defendant 
has appealed and plaintiff herewith responds, but plain-
tiff did not file a cross-appeal from the court's denial of 
plaintiff's request for custody of the minor children. 
Defendant, in her brief, has referred to appellant 
and respondent by the letters "P" and "D", apparently 
designating plaintiff and defendant, as the parties ap-
peared in the court below. In order to achieve consistency 
and clarity in identifying the parties on appeal, plaintiff 
(respondent) will hereafter also use the designations 
plaintiff and defendant'. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts appearing in defendant's 
brief is, in the main, accurate. However, it is important 
to note that plaintiff's Order to Show Cause not only 
sought to obtain custody of the minor children, but, in the 
alternative, sought modification of the support payments 
reqUired by the earlier divorce decree (R. 64). The 
Order to Show Cause required defendant to appear on 
December 18, 1959 at 2:30p.m. (R. 64). Plaintiff's Motion 
for the Order to Show Cause did not specifically identify 
plaintiff's counsel, but attorney Rulon W. Clark of the 
law firm of Clark and Clark notarized the verification of 
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plaintiff (R. 63). Relying upon the hearing set for 
December 28, counsel for plaintiff obtained a witness 
from Las \r egas, who flew to Salt Lake City to give 
testimony (T. 7). When plaintiff's counsel and plain-
tiff's 'vitnesses appeared in court for the hearing, it was 
learned for the first time that the attorney for defendant 
had obtained an ex parte continuance of the Order to 
Show Cause without serving notice upon plaintiff or his 
attorney (R. 67). Notice was given neither to Rulon W. 
Clark, who notarized the verification, nor to plaintiff, 
who signed the motion (R. 67). Thereupon, Judge Jep-
pson vacated the order of continuance to permit the per-
petuation of testimony from the Las Vegas witness (R. 
68), and the matter was then re-set for further hearing 
on January 18, 1960, and was then continued to February 
4, 1960 (R. 95). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
DISQUALIFY ITSELF. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NO·T ERR IN CONSIDERING AND 
REDUCING SUPPORT PAYMENTS. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING COUNSEL 
FEES TO DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
DISQUALIFY ITSELF. 
The entire basis of the affidaVit of prejudice is that 
Judge Jeppson vacated the ex parte order of oontinuance 
when· he learned that plaintiff's counsel had produced a 
witness from Las Vegas and had ·not received notice of 
the order of continuance. As to this matter, as the af-
fidavit shows, Judge Jeppson only provided for the per-
petuation from the one witness from Las Vegas in order 
. to avoid . the expense of bringing the witness to Utah a 
second time. Since defendant's counsel obviously could 
have given notice either to plaintiff directly or to attorney 
Rulon W. Clark, it was no indication of prejudice to give 
to defendant's counsel any of the three alternatives: (1) 
To appear in court on December 18 and cross-examine 
the witness; or (2) to fail to appear in court and waive 
the right of cross-examination; or (3) Pay the trans-
portation expense of the witness and the attorney's fee 
of plaintiff's counsel by having the witness return for a 
later hearing for cross-examination by defendant's coun-
sel (R. 73~75). This· conduct is hardly_ indi~tive of pre-
judice. 
Further, defendant's counsel waited ·until January 
13 to file her affidavit of· prejudice (R. 75),. and -this 
certainly was not as soo-n as "practicable" as: required 
by Rule 63· (b), URCP. According to the rule,. the judge 
need only certify the affidavit to another- judge when it 
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is filed as '~soon a~ practicable" after counsel has learned 
of the suspected bais or prejudice. 
In any event, if any technical error was conrmitted, it 
was hannless, and does not justify a reversal on appeal. 
There is no foundation in fact for any of the bias and 
prejudice alleged by defendant's counsel, and it is note-
worthy that nothing appears in defendant's brief by way 
of citation to the record to show that any error in this 
regard was more than technical and harmless. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CO·NSIDERING AND 
REDUCING SUPPORT PAYMENTS. 
Point No. II of defendant's brief contends that the 
court erred in even considering education of support pay-
ments. But the issue was raised in plaintiff's motion for 
an order to show cause (R. 62'), in the Order to Show 
Cause (R. 64), and evidence was introduced relative to 
that issue at the hearing (T. 90-92). It cannot reasonably 
be argued that the court erred in considering reduction 
of the support payments. 
Point No. III of defendant's brief contends that the 
court erred in reducing the support payments. This is 
not so! It appeared from the testimony that plaintiff's 
expenses had substantially increased between the time 
of the earlier decree and the time of the hearing. wherein 
the support payments were reduced. Plaintiff had bor-
rowed an additional $1,000.00 to pay to defendant, was 
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required to pay the utility, upkeep and related expense 
on the house \\~hich defendant had theretofore lived in, 
and was burdened by the increase in child support pay-
rnents frorn $60.00 per child per month to $90.00 per 
child per month (R .. 90-92). Plaintiff's financial difficulty 
in large part arose from the transaction involving the 
house which the parties 'vere purchasing prior to their 
divorce. It appeared at the time of the divorce that the 
parties had an equity in the house, and defendant was 
awarded the equity and was permitted to live in the 
house. The divorce decree provided that the support pay-
ments which plaintiff was required to 1nake would in-
crease 50% if the house were sold (R. 37), a11d when 
defendant decided that the expense of maintaining the 
house was more than she could bear, she transferred the 
house to plaintiff, and plaintiff borrowed $1,000.00 to 
pay to defendant, and, in addition to retiring this in-
debtedness, continued to pay the mortgage installments 
on the house, began paying the utilities, maintenance and 
upkeep, and assumed increased child support payments 
from $120.00 per month to $180.00 per month. Since 
plaintiff's take-home pay was only $260.00 per month, 
plus $20.00 per month from U. S. Army Reserve drills, 
Judge Jeppson found that the change in circumstances, 
particularly the transactions relating to the house, justi-
fied reduction of. the support payments to $150.00 per 
month for the two minor children. 
The trial judge listened to the witnesses and con-
sidered the evidence. His findings with regard to a 
material change in circumstance should not be upset on 
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appeal unless there appears to be a serious abuse of 
judicial disrretion. It is undeniable that there were 
changes in plaintiff's financial circun1stances. It is 
further undeniable that plaintiff is paying 54o/o of his 
gross incorne for the support of t'vo minor children under 
the reduced support pay1nents, and was paying over 64% 
of his gross income for child support before the payments 
were reduced. This is not such an abuse of discretion so 
as to justify a reversal on appeal. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING COUNSEL 
FEES TO DE·FENDANT'S ATTORNEY. 
Defendant contends that the trial judge denied 
counsel fees because he thought he was bound to do so 
as a matter of law, but admits that the trial judge would 
not sign findings and conclusions which recited that such 
fees were denied as a matter of law (Appellant's Brief, 
PP·, 14-15). 
Plaintiff admits that the award or denial of counsel 
fees is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the 
trial court in matters of this kind, and within reasonable 
limits it is not error to award or to deny such fees 
(Marks v. Marks, 98 Utah 400, 100 P. 2d 207). But since 
defendant's counsel had her opportunity to request at-
torney fees and to argue the law in support of her claim 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-15), and since the trial court 
denied such request for fees after finding that plaintiff 
was justified in seeking a reduction in support payments 
(R. 109), and after the trial judge based his decision upon 
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his sound judicial discretion, refusing to base it upon a 
compulsory denial as a matter of law (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 15), it must be assumed that the trial judge acted within 
the permissible limits of his discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff obtained an Order to Show Cause in an 
effort to obtain custody of minor children when he had 
reason to believe they were being badly neglected by 
defendant, and only secondarily sought reduction in the 
child support payments. After a full and fair hearing, 
Judge Jeppson concluded that the circumstances were 
not sufficient to warrant a change in the custody of the 
children, but that the financial situation of plaintiff had 
materially changed to his detriment so as to justify a 
moderate reduction in child support payments. If any 
error was committed at the trial level, which plaintiff 
denies, it was inadvertent, inconsequential and harmless, 
and does not justify a reversal on appeal. The evidence 
amply supports the action of the trial court in reducing 
the support payments, and it is respectfully submitted 
that the judgment of the trial court should be affinned. 
As a final note, plaintiff observes that defendant's 
Point No. V on appeal assails the trial court for ordering 
payment of costs after the filing by defendant of an af-
fidavit of impecuniosity. Apparently the trial judge 
thought the clerk of the court should have been paid the 
costs out of the $1,000.00 which plaintiff paid to defendant 
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for her equity in the house. While plaintiff is of the 
opinion that the trial court was clearly. ·right in this 
regard, the issue seems to be one between the District 
Court and defendant, and it is difficult to see how plain-
tiff is a real party in interest with regard to this issue. 
Therefore, plaintiff elects not to contest or argue the 
merits of this issue on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLARK AND CLARK 
By: Calvin E. Clark 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
1006 Deseret Building 
Salt L·ake City, Utah 
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